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  The present article provides an economic analysis to examine how contract 
damages affects both breach and investment decisions over time.  Unlike the standard 
static model, this article studies a model in which, upon signing a contract, a seller invests 
over two periods, and a buyer may breach anytime. The dynamic structure of the model 
allows us to investigate investment dynamics under alternative contract damages.  First, 
under expectation damages, the seller has an incentive to invest only in the first period 
(front-loading of investment). Second, under reliance damages, a similar front-loading of 
investment occurs, and the degree of front-loading is excessive relative to the expectation 
damages. Third, under restitution damages, the seller has an incentive to invest only in 
the second period. We also examine efficiency properties of new hybrid measures of 
damages in which damages depend on the timing of breach.  
 
 
 1.  Introduction 
 
Parties to a contract often take actions in advance of performance that will 
enhance the contract’s value to them.  In a contract for production of a specialized 
machine, a seller can prepare for the manufacturing of the good by making a blue print, 
hiring workers, and purchasing materials.  A buyer expecting to receive the machine can 
train her employees to use it, and advertise the final product that can be made by using 
the machine. Such value-enhancing investments are relationship-specific when 
investments create more surpluses within the relationship than without. In the law and 
economics literature, specific investment is called reliance, because they are taken in 
reliance on performance.     
  There is a sizable literature studying how alternative contract damages for breach 
affect incentives for breach decision and investment decision. While the literature has 
shown many important insights, the underlying models abstract from realistic investment 
dynamics inherent in many business relationships. Specifically, in the literature, all 
investments are made only once at a particular stage, and then contractual uncertainty is 
resolved at the next stage.  
  In practice, however, investment can be made anytime after a contract is signed 
and before the contract is completed (that is, before an actual production of the machine). 
Investments may also take several stages. For example, in a defense procurement of a 
new weapons system, a contractor’s research and development may take several years. In 
such a circumstance, contractual uncertainty can be realized before all investments are 
made. For example, a buyer of the specialized machine may receive information on the true value of the machine before the seller makes all investments.  The buyer who finds 
out a low demand for the final product may want to breach the contract after the seller 
made some (but not all) investments. 
  The present article provides an economic analysis to examine how contract 
damages affects both breach and investment decisions over time.  In particular, this 
article investigates whether an efficient time pattern of investment can be induced by 
contract damages. It also studies investment dynamics under alternative contract 
damages, and under a new hybrid measure of damages in which the size of damages 
depend on the timing of breach.   
  Suppose the buyer observes the true value of the machine either in the first period 
or the second period.  The buyer may breach the contract in the first period (early breach) 
or in the second period (late breach). The seller makes cost-reducing investment at the 
beginning of each period. Assume that the first-period investment will be more effective 
than the second-period investment in reducing the cost of production in terms of marginal 
benefit.  The socially efficient level of the first-period investment will balance between 
its higher efficiency (than the second-period one) and the probability that the first-period 
investment may not have any value due to an early breach.  Given the efficient first-
period investment, the efficient second-period investment can be identified to balance 
between the marginal benefit of the cost-reducing second-period investment and the 
marginal cost of it. The equilibrium levels of investment under alternative contract 
damages are not likely efficient.  We focus both the total level of investment and how it is 
allocated across two periods under standard damages measures.    The basic measure of damages for breach is the expectation measure -- the 
amount that will put the seller (the victim of breach) in the same position he would have 
enjoyed had the contract been carried out. Define the ED rule as the rule applying the 
expectation measure when a breach occurs, regardless of its timing. Since the seller 
expects to have full benefit of the contract regardless of whether and when the contract is 
breached, the ED rule induces excessive total investment. The over-investment result is 
standard in the existing literature. It is shown in the present article that, under the ED 
rule, the seller has an incentive to invest only in the first period (front-loading of 
investment). Since the seller is implicitly insured with expectation damages, the seller 
will take only the first-period investment that is more effective than the second-period 
one.   
  Another standard measure of damages is reliance measure that compensates the 
victim of the breach for his reliance expenditure (investment cost) – so that the party is 
restored to the position he had before he made the contract.  Define the RD rule as the 
rule applying the reliance measure when a breach occurs, regardless of its timing.   
Reliance measure of damages is ordinarily less than the expectation measure and thus it 
will result in more frequent breach than does the expectation measure. Since the seller 
will be made worse off if there is a breach under the RD rule, the seller will want to 
reduce the likelihood of breach by increasing investment and thereby the amount of 
damages.  It is well established in the existing literature that the level of investment under 
the RD rule is more excessive than investment is under the ED rule. The same argument 
applies to the model of this article. It is shown in the present article that, under the RD 
rule, the seller has an incentive to invest only in the first period (front-loading of investment), and that the level of investment under the RD rule is more excessive than 
investment is under the ED rule.          
  The third standard measure of damages is restitution measure that requires the 
breaching party to give back what he or she took from the victim.  Restitution measure is 
a minimal remedy because it does not compensate the victim of breach for expectation or 
reliance. From an incentive perspective, however, restitution measure may be able to 
reduce the excessive investment problem under the ED and RD rule. Define the ND rule 
as applying restitution damages when a breach occurs.  It is shown that under the ND rule 
the seller has an incentive to invest only in the second period.  Given that the buyer does 
not compensate the seller for his breach under the ND rule, it will result in more frequent 
breach than does the expectation measure.  That implies that there will be less than 
efficient level of total investment under the ND rule.  Furthermore, there is no incentive 
to invest in the first period since there is no compensation for investment in case of 
breach and there is excessive breach. 
  Those standard measures of damages are time-independent, as the same measure 
of damages is applied regardless of the time of a breach.  For example, under the 
expectation damage measure, the seller would be fully compensated with expected profit 
either when the buyer breaches in an early stage or when the buyer breaches at a late 
stage.  In the dynamic model of the present paper, however, we can investigate the 
efficiency of new hybrid rules under which different measures of damages are applied 
depending on the timing of breach. For instance, the courts may award reliance damages 
if a breach occurs in an early stage, while they award expectation damages for late breach.  Our study of such hybrid rules reveals that the total level of investment depends on the 
damages rule for late breach, and the composition of investments across time depends on 
the damages rule for early breach. Therefore, hybrid rules based on standard damage 
measures would not improve efficiency relative to the time-independent damage 
measures.  
  It would be interesting to investigate whether efficiency can be improved by 
stipulated damages – damages stipulated in the contract by the contracting parties. We 
show that perfect expectation damages can induce the first-best outcomes.  Perfect 
expectation damages equal the damages needed to restore the victim of breach who 
invested efficiently to the position he would have enjoyed had the contract been carried 
out. A potential problem with perfect expectation damages is that informational 
requirement in calculating them is quite demanding. 
  




2.  Model 
 
The basic model involves two parties: a buyer and a seller (producer). Both parties 
are assumed to be risk neutral. At time t = 0, the parties agree on a contract with a 
contract price P ∈R++. The contract price is assumed to be paid by the buyer to the seller 
at the time of performance at t = 3. The sequence of moves is illustrated in Table 1. 
The seller will make relationship-specific investments that reduce the cost of 
production. The investments are specific since there are no outside markets for these 
investments. Production occurs at the final stage of action. To study the dynamics of 
investment, consider a model in which the seller invests over two periods. Let e1 denote 
the first-period investment made at t = 1. If the contractual relationship continues without 
the buyer’s breach, then the seller makes the second-period investment e2. 
An exogenous public signal is generated with probability π at the end of the first 
period (that is, after e1 is sunken).
i Let V∈R+ denote the value of the product to the buyer. 
V is stochastic and distributed with the cumulative distribution function F(V). If a signal 
is generated (that is, V is realized), then the buyer will decide whether he wants to 
continue to next stage or to breach and terminate the contractual relationship. If he 
breaches, he has to compensate the seller with damages D1 according to a prevailing legal 
rule. If no signal is generated, the buyer does not change belief and proceed to the next 
stage. 
At t = 2, the seller will invest e2 if the other party did not breach earlier. If a signal 
was generated in the previous period and the buyer did not breach, then the seller know the buyer’s valuation of the good is higher than the pre-agreed price and there is no risk 
of breaching in the future. On the other hand, if a signal was not generated, the seller 
knows he may need to be relatively conservative when investing.  
At the end of the second period, V is known publicly. The buyer decides whether to 
honour the contract or paying damages. At this stage, the amount of damages denoted by 
D2 may be different from D1. We will focus on the situation in which the amount of 
damages increases over time, D2 ≥ D 1. This assumption is made to guarantee that the 
buyer will breach only in the first given opportunity. For example, if a very low V is 
realised in the first period, the buyer will breach the contract at t = 1.  It does not pay for 
the buyer to wait until the second period to announce his breach.  
If the contract has not been breached before, production takes place at t = 3. The cost 
to the seller of production is C(e1, e2). To compare the size of investment under 
alternative legal rules, we assume C(e1, e2) = C(αe1 + e2), where α  ≥ 1. The parameter 
α can be viewed as an efficiency-enhancing factor for the early investment.
ii The idea is 
that early preparation for contractual performance would be beneficial. It does not 
necessarily imply that the efficient pattern of investment requires investing only on the 






 Table 1 Sequences of moves 
Time t  Activities 
0  A contract is signed with a fixed price, P. 
1  Seller invests cost reducing investment e1. 
2  V is known with probability π 
First breaching opportunity for buyer. 
3  Seller invests cost reducing investment e2. 
4  V is realized with probability 1-π 
Final breaching opportunity for buyer. 


























P-C- e1- e2 
 
V-P 
P-C- e1- e2 
 
V-P 
D2- e1- e2 
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 3.   Analysis 
 
3.1  First-best outcome 
 
The first-best efficient outcome is identified as a benchmark by solving the model 
backward. 
 
Buyer’s decision: Efficient breach 
  Fix any given e1.  
  If V is known at the end of the second period (with probability 1-π), 
  At t = 2  :  Perform if V ≥ C(αe1+e2); Breach otherwise 
  If V is known at the end of the first period, (with probability π) 
At t = 1  :  Perform if V ≥ C(αe1+ ẽ2*) + ẽ2*; Breach otherwise, where 
ẽ2* is the efficient level of second period investment if the signal arrived in the first 
period. 
 
Seller’s decision: Efficient investment 
  At t = 2:  Case A: (V is known in time 1)  
Let e1* be the efficient first-period investment level. 
Let ẽ2* be the efficient investment level if V is known at time 1.   
Given a favourable signal, i.e. V –C(e1*, ẽ2*) - e1*- ẽ2* ≥ 0, the 
seller solves 
Max e2 {V –C (αe1*+e2) - e1*- e2}  F.O.C.   -C’(αe1*+ ẽ2*)  =  1      (1) 
 
   O t h e r w i s e ,   ẽ2*=0.  
 
      Case B: (V is known in time 2) 
Let ê2* be the efficient investment level if V is only known at time 
2. The seller solves 
Max e2 {∫ V ≥ C (αe1*+e2) [V –C (αe1*+e2)] dF(V)- e1*- e2} 
  F.O.C.   –C’  (αe1*+ ê2*) (1- F(C (αe1*+ ê2*))) = 1    (2)   
 
Lemma 1: Given identical previous investments, the first best outcome requires 
larger subsequent investment after realization of a favourable V. 
Proof:    from (1)  –C’ (αe1*+ ẽ2*)  =  1       
from (2)  –C’ (αe1*+ ê2*) (1- F(C (αe1*+ ê2*))) = 1 
Î  –C’ (αe1*+ ẽ2*) < –C’ (αe1*+ ê2*) 
Î  C’ (αe1*+ ẽ2*) > C’ (αe1*+ ê2*) 
Î  αe1*+ ẽ2* >αe1*+ ê2* 
Î  ẽ2* > ê2*  ڤ 
 
At time 1:   Max e1 {π ∫ V ≥ C (αe1+ ẽ 2*) + ẽ 2* [V –C (αe1+ ẽ2*) –ẽ2*] dF(V)  
+ (1-π)[ ∫ V ≥ C (αe1+ê 2*) [V –C (αe1+ ê2*) –ê2*] dF(V) }- e1 
 F.O.C.   By  envelope  Theorem, 
πα [–C’ (αe1*+ ẽ2*)] [1- F(C (αe1*+ ẽ2*) + ẽ2*)] + (1-π)α[–C’ (αe1*+ ê2*)] [1-F (C (αe1*+ ê2*)]} – 1 = 0 
      Substituting in equation (1) and (2), 
We get   πα [1- F(C (αe1*+ ẽ2*) + ẽ2*)] + (1-π)α = 1 
Î  α [1- πF(C (αe1*+ ẽ2*) + ẽ2*)] = 1  (3) 
In order to guarantee an interior solution, we make the following 
assumption. 
 
Assumption:   α [1- πF(C (αe1*+ ẽ2*) + ẽ2*)] = 1.  
 
 Intuitively,  F(C  (αe1+ ẽ2*) + ẽ2*) is the probability of breaching given a signal in 
time 1 which arrives with probability π. In other words, [1- πF(C (αe1+ ẽ2*) + ẽ2*)] is the 
probability of contract being honoured. α is the efficiency enhancing factor of early 
investment. Therefore, the left side of the equation is equivalent to the expected marginal 
benefit of early stage investment. This equals the marginal cost of investment, which is 1. 
Note that the value of total investment (αe1+ e2) is important. If the contract is not 
breached in time 1, e2 will be adjusted in order to achieve the appropriate total investment 
value. 
Consider the special case with the values of investments are identical across time 
(α=1), first best require e1= 0 and investing only in the second period. Intuitively, if there 
is no gain in early investments, the seller should wait till the last stage to invest. This is 
the stage where most information is available and the seller will be able to make more 
accurate investments. 
 Proposition 1: Assuming an interior solution, the first best outcome (e1*, ẽ2*, 
ê2*) is characterized by    
(i)   α [1- πF(C (αe1*+ ẽ2*) + ẽ2*)] = 1 
   (ii)  -C’  (αe1*+ ẽ2*) = 1  if the contract is honoured in time 1. 
            ẽ2* = 0     otherwise 
(iii)  –C’ (αe1*+ ê2*) [1- F(C (αe1*+ ê2*))] = 1 
  
   
3.2   Equilibrium 
There are usually three types of possible remedies awarded by: 
Expectation damages (ED) 
Reliance damages (RD) 
Restitution damages (ND) 
In our model,   D1
ED = P-C (αe1+e2*)-e2* D2
ED= P-C (αe1+e2) 
     D 1
RD = e1    D 2
RD= e1+e2 
     D1
ND = 0    D 2
ND= 0 
The court may award different damages if breaching occurs in different stages 
(Hybrid rules). We will analyze the following four cases (as illustrated in Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Possible combinations of damages rule. 
Damages rule design  Time 1 (D1)  Time 2 (D2) 
ED rule  ED  ED 
RD rule  RD  RD ND rule  ND  ND 
Hybrid rule 1  RD  ED 
 
Lemma 2:  If the buyer did not breach after realizing V, the seller will invest 
efficiently such that ẽ2 solves C’ (αe1+ ẽ2) = 1. This is independent 
on the choice of default rules.  
  On the other hand, if the buyer breach after realizing V, the seller 
will not invest. 
Proof:  Given the buyer did not breach after realizing V in time 2, the 
buyer will definitely honour the contract. Therefore, independent 
on default rules, the objective functions for the seller are: 
     Max e2 {P –C (αe1+ e2) - e1- e2}  
F.O.C.   -C’ (αe1+ ẽ 2) = 1  ڤ     (4) 
      It is obvious that if the buyer breach, seller should not invest again. 
What Lemma 2 tells us is that we do not need to calculate ẽ2 in every case. Instead, 
we concentrate on calculating e1 and ê2. 
 
Case 1: Expectation damages rule 
The court essentially assigns all risks to the buyer. Regardless of time of breach, ED will 
be applied. The seller will always get his expected value. 
Buyer’s decision: 
  At time 2  :  Perform if V ≥ C (αe1 + e2); Breach otherwise 
  At time 1  :  Perform if V ≥ C (αe1 + ẽ 2) + ẽ 2; Breach otherwise Seller’s decision: 
At time 2 (V is not known): 
Let e1
ED be the equilibrium early-investment. 
Let ê2
ED be the equilibrium late-investment if V is unknown. 
Max e2 {[P –C (αe1
ED + e2)] - e1
ED - e2} 
  F.O.C.   -C’  (αe1
ED + ê 2
ED)  =  1    (5)   
It is noted that the second period investment (condition on e1) is larger 
than optimum in this situation. 
 
At time 1:   This is the seller’s problem. 
Max e1 {π  [P –C (αe1+ ẽ 2
 ED) –ẽ 2
 ED]  
+ (1-π)[P –C (αe1+ ê 2
ED) –ê 2
ED]} - e1 
From equation (4) and (5), ẽ 2
 ED = ê 2
ED. Thus the seller’s problem 
can be rewritten as: 
Max e1 [P –C (αe1+ e2
 ED) –e 2
 ED]  
F.O.C.   -αC’ (αe1
ED + e 2
ED) = 1        (6) 
Equation (6) and (5) contradicts as α >1. This implies that there is 
no interior solution for e1ED’. The corner solution requires the seller to 
invest everything in the first period. Since there is no risk for the seller, the 
sole objective for him is to reduce the cost of production and not worry 
about the breach. Investing early is more efficient than investing late. This 
gives incentive for the seller to invest only in the most efficient time, which is the first investment stage. Seller will invest too much 
prematurely. 
 
Proposition 2: The seller will only invest in the first period under expectation 
damages rule. The seller’s investment is excessive under expectation damages 
rule relative to the first-best one. 
 
Case 2: Reliance damages rule 
  All the buyer needs to do is to compensate only the reliance expense of the seller. 
The risk is distributed between the two parties. 
Buyer’s decision: 
  At time 2  :  Perform if V ≥ P - e1- e2; Breach otherwise 
  At time 1  :  Perform if V ≥ P - e1; Breach otherwise 
Seller’s decision: 
At time 2 (V is not known):  
Let ê2
RD be the efficient investment level at time 2 if V is only known at 
time 2. 
Max e2 {∫ V ≥ P - e1RD’- e2 [P –C (αe1
RD + e2) - e1
RD - e2] dF(V) } 
  =  Max  e2 {[P –C (αe1
 RD + e2) - e1
RD- e2] [1-F (P- e1
 RD - e2)]} 
  F.O.C.      [-C’  (αe1
 RD + ê 2
 RD)-1] (1-F (P- e1
 RD - ê 2
 RD))  
+ [P –C (αe1
 RD + ê 2
 RD) - e1
RD- ê 2
 RD] f (P- e1
 RD - ê 2
 RD)  
= 1         ( 7 )    
At time 1:   This is the seller’s problem.  Max  e1 {π [P –C (αe1+ ẽ 2
 RD) - ẽ 2
 RD -e 1
 ] [1-F (P- e1)]  
+ (1-π) [P –C (αe+ ê 2
 RD) - ê 2
 RD- e1] [1-F (P- e1 - ê 2
 RD)]} 
F.O.C.   π [P –C (αe1
 RD + ẽ 2
 RD) - ẽ 2
 RD -e 1
 RD ] f(P- e1
 RD) 
  +  π [–αC’ (αe1
 RD + ẽ 2
 RD) -1] [1-F (P- e1
 RD)] 
  +  (1-π) [P –C (αe1
 RD + ê 2
 RD) - ê 2
 RD- e1] f(P- e1
 RD - ê 2
 RD) 
+ (1-π) [–αC’ (αe1
 RD + ê 2
 RD) - 1] [1-F (P- e1
 RD - ê 2
 RD)]  
 =  π [P –C (αe1
 RD + ẽ 2
 RD) - ẽ 2
 RD -e 1
 RD ] f(P- e1
 RD) 
  +  π [ α -1] [1-F (P- e1
 RD)] 
+ (1-π) [1- (α−1) C’ (αe1
 RD + ê 2
 RD) [1-F (P- e1
 RD - ê 2
 RD)] 
        ( 8 )  
It is noted that equation (8) is always positive. This means that corner 
investment will occur. Intuitively, if there is a breach, the seller will get a profit of 
zero. If a contract is honoured, the seller will get a positive surplus. It is obvious 
that the seller’s objective is to minimize the chance of breaching. Investing early 
will decrease the chance of breaching in the early stage. At the same time, early 
investments are more efficient. Thus, it makes sense for seller to invest in the first 
period.  
 
Proposition 3: Seller will only invest in the first period under the RD rule. The 
seller’s investment under the RD rule is more excessive than his investment under 
the ED rule. 
 
Case 3:  Restitution damages rule   The buyer is not responsibility for any damages while the seller is the entire risk 
bearer.  
Buyer’s decision: 
  At time 2  :  Perform if V ≥ P; Breach otherwise 
  At time 1  :  Perform if V ≥ P; Breach otherwise 
Seller’s decision: 
At time 2 ( V is not known):   
  Let  ê2
ND be the investment level if V is only known at time 2. 
Max e2 {{∫ V ≥ P [P –C (αe1
 ND + e2)] dF(V)- e1
 ND - e2}} 
 
  F.O.C.   -C’  (αe1
 ND + ê 2
 ND) (1-F (P))= 1      (9)   
At time 1:   This is the seller’s problem. 
Max e1 {π ∫ V ≥ P [P –C (αe1+ ẽ 2
 ND) - ẽ 2
 ND] dF(V) 
+ (1-π)[ ∫ V ≥ P [P –C (αe1+ ê 2
 ND))] dF(V) - ê 2
 ND] -e1} 
differentiate with respect to e1 gives 
   πα[–C’ (αe1+ ẽ 2
 ND) ] [1-F (P)]  
+ (1-π)α[ –C’ (αe1+ ê 2
 ND)] [1-F(P)]α- 1 
      Substituting in equation (4), (9), we get: 
   πα[1-F (P)] + (1-π)α −1 
      = α − παF (P) -1 
= α(1-πF (P)) − 1        (10) 
  Note that P - C(αe1*+ ẽ2*) - ẽ2* > 0 since the left-hand side is the 
seller’s expected profit when the efficient investments are made and the contract is completed.  Then,  α(1-πF  (P))  −1 <  α[1-πF  (C(αe1*+  ẽ2*) + 
ẽ2*)]  −1 = 0 from Assumption 3. Since the sign of the equation (10) is 
negative, the seller will invest only in the second period.  
 
Proposition 4: The seller will only invest in the second period under pure 
restitution damages rule.  
 
 
Given the above results, three standard measures of damages do not create 
efficient patterns of investments.  It would be interesting to examine whether making 
damages depend on time of breach can improve incentives for investments. 
 
Case 4: Hybrid Rule 1 (RD for early breach and ED for late breach) 
  This is one of the interesting scenarios and it has not been explored in the 
literature. The damages rule is time-dependent. This means that the court will allow 
reliance damages at an early stage of contractual relationship and expectation damages at 
a later stage.  
Buyer’s decision: 
  At time 2  :  Perform if V ≥ C (αe1 + e2); Breach otherwise   (ED) 
  At time 1  :  Perform if V ≥ P - e1; Breach otherwise    (RD) 
Seller’s decision: 
  At time 2 (When V is not known) 
Let e1
R&E be the investment level at time 1. Let ê 2
 R&E be the investment level if V is known at time 2. 
Max e2 {P –C (αe1
R&E + e2) - e1
R&E - e2}  
F.O.C.   -C’ (αe1
R&E + ê 2
R&E) = 1        (11) 









At time 1:   This is the seller’s problem. 
Max e1 {π ∫ V ≥ P - e1 [P –C (αe1+e2
 R&E) –ẽ 2
 R&E - e1] dF(V)  
+ (1-π) ∫ V ≥ P - e1- ê 2 [P –C (αe1+ ê 2
 R&E)] dF(V) –ê 2
 R&E - e1] 
Î Max  e1 {π [P –C (αe1+e2
 R&E) –ẽ 2
 R&E - e1](1-F(P- e1)) 
+ (1-π)[P –C (αe1+ ê 2
 R&E)] (1-F(P- e1 –ê 2
 R&E )) 
– (1-π)ê 2
 R&E - (1-π)e1} 
  Differentiate with respect to e1:    
  { π [P –C (αe1+e2
 R&E) –ẽ 2
 R&E - e1] (f(P- e1)) 
+π [–C’(αe1+e2
 R&E) (α−α)+α−1](1-F(P- e1)) 
+ (1-π)[P –C (αe1+ ê 2
 R&E)] (f(P- e1 –ê 2
 R&E )(-1+ α) 
+ (1-π)[ –C (αe1+ ê 2
 R&E)(α−α)] (1-F(P- e1 –ê 2
 R&E ) 
- (1-π)(−α) − (1-π)  
   =   π [α−1](1-F(P- e1)) + (1-π)(1-F(P- e1 –ê 2
 R&E ) 
+ (1-π)(α − 1)  > 0       ( 1 2 )  
 
It is noted that equation (12) is non zero. This means that 
investment will only occur in one of the periods. In other words, this will 
generate the same outcome as expectation damages rule. In other words, there is no need to consider implementing reliance damages in the early 
stage and expectation damages at the later stage. Pure expectation 
damages rule will generate identical results. 
 
Proposition 5: Hybrid Rule 1 (RD for early breach and ED for late breach 
generates the same outcome as the ED rule. 
 
Case 5: Hybrid Rule 2 (ND for early breach and ED for late breach) 
We will explore another time-dependent damages rule. In this situation, the court 
will allow restitution damages at an early stage of contractual relationship and 
expectation damages at a later stage.  
 
Buyer’s decision: 
  At time 2  :  Perform if V ≥ C (αe1 + e2); Breach otherwise 
  At time 1  :  Perform if V ≥ P; Breach otherwise 
Seller’s decision: 
At time 2(V is not known): 
Let e1
N&E be the equilibrium early-investment. 
Let ê2
 N&E be the equilibrium late-investment if V is unknown. 
Max e2 {[P –C (αe1
 N&E + e2)] - e1
 N&E - e2} 
  F.O.C.   -C’  (αe1
 N&E + ê 2
 N&E) = 1        (13)   
It is noted that the second period investment (condition on e1) is larger 
than optimum in this situation. At time 1:   This is the seller’s problem. 
 Max e1 {π  [1-F(P)] [P –C (αe1+e2
 N&E) –ẽ 2
 N&E] - π e1 
+ (1-π) [P –C (αe1+ ê 2
 N&E) –ê 2
 N&E - e1] } 
F.O.C.   π (1-F (P)) (-αC’ (αe1
 N&E + ẽ 2
 N&E) )- π 
+ (1-π) (-C’ (αe1
 N&E + ê 2
 N&E) -1))    ( 1 4 )  
=  π (1-F (P)) (α) - π  
=   π (α-αF (P) -1)    Independent of e 
  We will probably have a non-zero constant. This implies the seller will also invest 
in one of the periods. Under this situation, the seller will only invest in the latter stage. 
Intuitively, the seller will not invest early as he bears all risks even early investment is 
more efficient. This creates the same investment pattern as the pure restitution damages 
rule. However, the total amount of investment equals the pure expectation damages rule. 
In other words, this hybrid rule encourage investing late.  
 
Proposition 6: Hybrid Rule 2 (ND for early breach and ED for late breach 
generates the same weighted aggregate as the pure ED rule. However, the timing 
is reversed. 
 
Case 6: Hybrid Rule 3 (ND for early breach and RD for late breach) 
  Under Hybrid Rule 3, the court will allow restitution damages for early breaches 
and reliance damages for late breaches. 
 
Buyer’s decision: At time 2  :  Perform if V ≥ P - e1- e2; Breach otherwise 




N&R be the equilibrium early-investment. 
Let ê2
 N&R be the equilibrium late-investment if V is unknown. 
Let ê2
N&R be the efficient investment level if V is only known at time 2. 
 
At time 2 (V is not known):  
Max e2 {[P –C (αe1
 N&R + e2) - e1
 N&R - e2] [1-F (P- e1
 N&R - e2)]} 
  F.O.C.      [-C’  (αe1
 N&R + ê 2
 N&R)-1] (1-F (P- e1
 N&R - ê 2
 N&R))  
+ [P –C (αe1
 N&R + ê 2
 N&R) - e1
 N&R - ê 2
 N&R] f (P- e1
 N&R - ê 2
 N&R)  
= 1        (15)   
 
At time 1:   This is the seller’s problem. 
 Max  e1 {π [P –C (αe1+ ẽ 2
 N&R) - ẽ 2
 N&R  ] [1-F (P)] -πe 1 
+ (1-π) [P –C (αe+ ê 2
 N&R) - ê 2
 N&R - e1] [1-F (P- e1 - ê 2
 N&R)]} 
  F.O.C. 
  π [ –αC‘(αe1
 N&R + ẽ 2
 N&R)
 ] [1-F (P)] -π  
+ (1-π) [P –C (αe1
 N&R + ê 2
 N&R) - ê 2
 N&R - e1
 N&R] [ f (P- e1
 N&R - ê 2
 N&R)] 
+ (1-π) [ –αC‘(αe1
 N&R + ê 2
 N&R) -1 ] [1-F (P- e1
 N&R - ê 2
 N&R)]} 
 
= π [ α
 ] [1-F (P)] -π  + (1-π) [1 + ( 1-αC‘(αe1
 N&R + ê 2
 N&R) [1-F (P- e1
 N&R - ê 2
 N&R)] 
(16) 
  Equation 16 is positive. We will have another corner solution. In this situation, 
sellers will wait in the early periods and invest only at the later stage. Intuitively, the 
seller will choose to invest in the stage where there is the least amount of risk even 
though it is not very effective. It is noted that the total amount of weighted investment is 
identical to the pure RD rule. Therefore, politicians can defer investment timing by 
introducing this hybrid rule. 
 
Proposition 7: Hybrid Rule 3 (ND for early breach and RD for late breach 




3.  Extensions 
 
1)  Possibility of Renegotiation 
Note that ED rule guarantees efficient breach decisions.  Thus, the possibility of 
ex post renegotiation does not affect the outcome of the ED rule.  The RD rule 
and ND rule do not generate efficient breach decisions.   
2)  Imperfect courts and transactions costs 
We have assumed so far that the buyer’s breach immediately terminates the 
contract and that litigation takes place without cost and instantaneously.    
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i This is public information in that both seller and buyer know if the signal is available or 
not. 
ii Note that there is no discounting. 